The Populist Detriment: the Case of Greece

A standard playbook from rise to fall.

The Populist Detriment: the Case of Greece
  • Kyriakos Mitsotakis*

In the aftermath of the global economic crisis of 2009-2010, which effectively marked the beginning of the most recent wave of attacks on democratic principles and order around the world, Greece was the first country that was engulfed by and eventually voted populist forces into power in 2015.

Most European countries, in particular those that were faced with similar challenges, were able to keep populists relatively at bay; in the legislative branch of government, but at least away from the executive.

Greece was unfortunate in this respect and to this day its democratic institutions and processes remain constantly under attack. But three years down the road, both civil society above all and the political class have been able to shed light on the path to normalcy.

For it is normalcy, within every facet of civil society imaginable, that populists seek to undermine and ultimately reverse.

The case of Greece is a most interesting and worthwhile example for every democracy and peoples around the world because it has followed a rather standard playbook from its rise to its fall.

Of course, before coming into power, populists in Greece were able to tap into civil discontent and frustration, the result of the fiscal tightening imposed as the result of the unfolding of the Greek economic crisis in 2010. It is true that the effective bankruptcy of the public sector and the state upended some Greek norms, in particular the very unhealthy and awkward mix of clientelism and state interference in the private economy. As a result, hundreds of thousands of people became unemployed and elements of the social contract disrupted as pensions and other public benefits were slashed.

Populists in Greece were both skillful and lucky. They were able to breed and foster a level of discontent that eventually transcended into hate and anger. They were also all too willing, in the name of their so called mission to right the wrongs of the past, to throw caution into the wind and use a constitutional clause relating to the election by parliament of the head of state, to overthrow a government that despite all else had been able to put the economy on track by achieving growth in 2014 and also had put the country on track of exiting the bailout program it was in.

Yet despite coming into government with rather advantageous terms in the beginning of 2015, which could have very realistically put them in the position of claiming credit for a final exit from economic supervision and memorandums based on the work of the previous government, they went on what is probably the most memorable attack of European institutions in the first six months of 2015. With a complete and utter ignorance of the world’s political and economic order, they tested game theory and simulated reality on the backs of ordinary working men and women.

Humiliated and discredited and with six full months that disrupted the Greek economy, the populists signed a third memorandum and by all serious economic estimates, including those of the European Stability Mechanism, brought upon a cost to the economy of around 100 billion euros. Obviously, the populists in Greece had a dream of how they would be able to transform Greece and Europe once in power. But even when their rude awakening came, they were just happy that they were still in power.

Populists all around the world know what to do before they come to power. But once in power, their disruptive and divisive brand of rhetoric and dark propaganda does them no good in governing or in forming serious policy propositions.

So they hunker down as they have done in Greece in order to keep their eye on the prize: power.

Greek populists have done three things. First, they have kept world attention and the country’s creditors at bay by meeting the demands of the third bailout program through exhaustive and punitive taxation.

Doing everything in their power to attack the middle class and small/medium enterprise may very well have some dogmatic intent behind it, but little political cost in their opinion. Because second, populists have marked their core base and diligently have served their narrow interests. Be they simple citizens given employment in the public sector or a new class of oligarchs given anything from media outlets to of course economic assets.

And third, populists in Greece, just as they have done in other places around the world such as Latin America and SE Asia, have attacked the very backbone of democratic order: separation of powers and checks and balances. Greece since January 2015 has been a case study for the populist playbook, with the key ingredients being disrupting constitutional and institutional processes, eliminating independent authorities, relaxing law and order and turning a blind eye to those intent of promoting civil and social disruption.

Long line of people waiting to withdraw cash from an ATM cashpoint outside a closed bank. Capital controls during Greek financial crisis.

If this playbook sounds like it has an authoritarian streak, indeed it does!

The populists in Greece are not out of power yet, but eventually they will be. The cost to our economy will be certainly tremendous. The scars left on our democracy will be deep and will for long remain visible.

And although populists are still in power, they are also very much irrelevant to the future of Greece. Because we will, as a people, find our way back to prosperity again.

But most important, because democracy itself is far stronger than any group bent on grabbing and holding power alone. The democratic ethos of Greek men and women is already a step and a day ahead of anyone intent to undermine it. Beyond any one party, beyond any ideology, the freedom and liberty entrenched in the Greek spirit will show us all the collective path we need to take back to democratic, civic and economic normalcy.

* President of New Democracy. He was elected to Hellenic Parliament with New Democracy in 2004, 2007, 2009, 2012 and 2015. Between 2007 and 2009 he served as the chairman of the Environmental Committee of the Hellenic Parliament. He served as minister of administrative reform and e-governance from June 2013 until January 2015.

 

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