Kim Jong Un purge suggests struggle for loyalty in North Korea

When North Korea's leading girl group took to a Pyongyang stage late last month to entertain a beige-clad military audience with such patriotic numbers as "I Like My Country the Most", the guest of honour was the defence minister, Hyon Yong Chol.

Within three days Hyon was dead, according to South Korean spies, executed with an anti-aircraft gun for such acts of disrespect as falling asleep during a speech by supreme leader Kim Jong Un.

Such a rapid downfall would be far from unprecedented under Mr Kim, who has undertaken what appears to be the most sweeping purge of top North Korean officials for decades.

But the fact that references to Hyon's activities can still be seen on state media has sparked scepticism from some analysts, highlighting the huge difficulty in assessing the opaque political situation in North Korea as Mr Kim seeks to consolidate his grip on power.

The official Rodong Sinmun newspaper's last mention of Hyon - of his presence at the Moranbong Band concert - was published on April 30. That casts doubt over the South Korean National Intelligence Service's claim that he was executed no later than that date, according to Cheong Seong-chang, an analyst at the Sejong Institute think-tank.

State news websites still show stories mentioning Hyon, who also appeared briefly in a film about Kim Jong Un that was shown on state television every day for a week from last Tuesday.

"When someone is purged in North Korea, he is no longer mentioned in North Korean media and his records are erased in official documents," said Koh Yu-hwan, a professor at Seoul's Dongguk University. "We should wait and see to verify the NIS's claim."

The NIS has given no details of how it acquires information on the North Korean political scene

But few question the notion that Mr Kim is presiding over extraordinary churn in the senior ranks of the state. Probably still in his late twenties when he took charge in December 2011, he lacked the long years of preparation for power enjoyed by his father, and had to assert his authority over a cadre of much older senior military figures.

After seven months Mr Kim replaced Ri Yong Ho, a top officer analysts believed had been assigned by Kim Jong Il to mentor his son during his first days in power. Within two years of taking office, Mr Kim had replaced about half the country's top 218 officials, according to the NIS.

The most prominent casualty was Jang Song Thaek, Mr Kim's top adviser and uncle by marriage, who was executed in December 2013 for alleged offences including plotting a coup. Jang's downfall was reported by the NIS before it was announced by Pyongyang, bolstering the perceived credibility of the agency's claims of a recent uptick in executions of senior officials.

Forty-one were put to death in 2014 and 15 so far this year, the NIS told lawmakers last month, for such offences as questioning Mr Kim's decision on a new building's design. The allegation that anti-aircraft fire was used to kill Hyon follows a report last month by the Committee for Human Rights in North Korea, which said satellite photography suggested the use of such weapons in a group execution last October.

The apparent growing bloodshed suggests to some observers that Mr Kim is struggling to maintain the loyalty of key lieutenants.

"If Hyon was really purged, it means Kim Jong Un is cornered, and the high-level officials have turned their back to him," says Kang Myung-do, who worked for Pyongyang's defence ministry before fleeing to the South, where he teaches at Kyungmin University.

But others argue that the leader appears to have pared the power of the military elite, directing increasing authority to civilian officials such as Hwang Pyong So, who rose through the influential Organisation and Guidance Department of the Korean Workers' party. Mr Hwang became vice-marshal last year and his prominent coverage in state media suggests he is established as Mr Kim's most senior official.

"The frequent reshuffling shows he is in full control," says Chung Young-tae, a researcher at the Korea Institute for National Unification. "Now that the North Korean economy has become slightly better than before, he is trying to strengthen the Communist party's role to guard against the military."

The tabular content relating to this article is not available to view. Apologies in advance for the inconvenience caused.

Most analysts still perceive North Korea's military as an important political force, however, and Mr Kim has left little scope for accusations he is soft on defence, despite the focus on boosting living standards and the national economy in his public pronouncements.

Chinese experts believe North Korea is producing nuclear weapons at a rapid pace: they think it had up to 20 at the end of last year, and could double that by the end of next year, according to Siegfried Hecker, a nuclear scientist briefed on their findings.

Last Saturday Pyongyang released footage that purported to show Mr Kim enthusiastically observing the launch of a ballistic missile from a submarine. While this would increase the potential nuclear threat from North Korea, the footage won a sceptical response from analysts such as Joseph Bermudez of AllSource Analysis, who said the rocket was more likely to have been launched from a submerged barge.

Whatever the level of Pyongyang's nuclear capabilities, such grandstanding by Mr Kim is an important part of his efforts to keep domestic control, says Mr Koh.

"He is trying to prevent internal resistance by heightening tension externally and through fear politics at home," says Mr Koh. "But this erratic rule cannot last for a long time. He will likely become more conciliatory once his power base becomes solid."

© The Financial Times Limited 2015. All rights reserved.
FT and Financial Times are trademarks of the Financial Times Ltd.
Not to be redistributed, copied or modified in any way.
Euro2day.gr is solely responsible for providing this translation and the Financial Times Limited does not accept any liability for the accuracy or quality of the translation

ΣΧΟΛΙΑ ΧΡΗΣΤΩΝ

blog comments powered by Disqus
v