Russia rattles sabres to keep Ukraine from the west

Violations of the ceasefire in eastern Ukraine have reached their highest level since the Minsk II agreement was signed in February, and President Petro Poroshenko has warned that war could re-erupt "at any moment".

US officials accuse Russia of again massing its troops along and within Ukraine's borders and international concerns are mounting - each time fighting breaks out, the risk of full-blown confrontation increases.

The problem is that while Minsk II reduced the violence its longer-term political elements have barely begun to be implemented. Stalemate reigns. But the longer Minsk goes unfulfilled, the greater the chance of renewed conflict.

More than 14 months after the annexation of Crimea, Moscow - outside a small circle of hardliners - does not want further large swaths of Ukrainian territory. Though it might back separatist moves to grab a few more towns - notably the port city of Mariupol - to make the rebel-held Donetsk and Lugansk republics more economically viable, it cannot afford much more.

Indeed, hit by sanctions and low oil prices, Moscow is doing all it can to avoid shouldering the costs of Donbass. Its aim, rather, is to thwart Ukraine's further integration into the EU and Nato - using the separatist regions as levers.

That means either imposing a Bosnia-style political settlement on Ukraine, making it both a dysfunctional state and giving eastern regions a veto over Nato membership, or freezing the conflict in a way that makes Ukraine indigestible to the west.

The aim of Russia's military build-up may be to pressure Kiev to comply with Minsk II - and get nervous western capitals to press it too - rather than prepare for an actual offensive.

For Russia would, in fact, like Minsk II implemented. It was a much better deal for Russia, and worse for Ukraine, than its predecessor last September.

<

The tabular content relating to this article is not available to view. Apologies in advance for the inconvenience caused.

That gives Russia, in effect, oversight over Ukraine's constitutional reforms. A footnote to Minsk II on what special status should entail, moreover, is highly unpalatable for Kiev. Separatist regions are supposed to create their own police forces and appoint prosecutors and judges. Kiev cannot dismiss local officials.

That is not quite Bosnia. But, says Samuel Charap, senior fellow at the International Institute for Strategic Studies, it has elements of a "confederal" structure, where central authorities lack supremacy over regional ones. "Maybe this is good enough for Putin, but I don't know if it's good for Ukraine," says Mr Charap.

Kiev's parliament passed a special status law for Donbass in March. But it added conditions: special status comes into force only after separatist regions hold free elections under Ukrainian law, and all "illegal armed groups" must withdraw before the polls.

As Moscow and rebel leaders have complained, while Minsk II called for elections, it did not make such linkages.

Senior Ukrainian officials insist they are complying fully with Minsk. They say elections are vital to produce lawfully elected officials Kiev can engage with, in place of the "criminals" who took power in unrecognised, separatist-organised ballots last November.

That leaves Kiev and Moscow in a stand-off. Russia hopes military posturing will persuade Ukraine to comply.

But renewed conflict could destroy any hope of western sanctions being lifted in June, in an EU review, or at the year-end - which could theoretically happen if Minsk is fully implemented.

Kiev, meanwhile, is gambling that the prospect of prolonged sanctions, and having to pay for Donbass - Ukraine stopped budgetary transfers to rebel regions last autumn - will make Russia accept its version of the settlement.

The danger is that, through the Georgia war in 2008, and the east Ukraine conflict, Moscow has made abundantly clear that Nato membership for either country is a "red line". Unless it feels that prospect has been put firmly out of reach, Russia may decide what it sees as its fundamental security concerns matter more than economic damage from further sanctions.

© The Financial Times Limited 2015. All rights reserved.
FT and Financial Times are trademarks of the Financial Times Ltd.
Not to be redistributed, copied or modified in any way.
Euro2day.gr is solely responsible for providing this translation and the Financial Times Limited does not accept any liability for the accuracy or quality of the translation