A phrase to madden the political obsessive is "they are all the same". Clearly, politicians are not all the same. Wander around Westminster and you can see Marxists chatting to libertarian zealots, single-issue fanatics huddled with unionists, retired businessmen commingled with thirtysomething hacks.
Yet all cliches contain a kernel of truth. Since 1979 British politics has tended to coalesce in the centre, particularly on the role of the state. Like footballers playing for a scoreless draw, the two largest parties warily man-marked one another. Labour aped the Conservatives, entering power in 1997 with a vow to match pre-existing spending plans, a compliment later returned in kind.
Hairline cracks in this consensus have now widened. At election time the Institute for Fiscal Studies needs more of a telescope than a magnifying glass to examine the parties' plans. This stems mainly from the Tories tightening their stance. Last autumn they promised a fiscal surplus in the next parliament, to be achieved without raising taxes. This would cause spending to be up to £40bn lower than if another party took the helm.
This may sound modest against a total envelope of £750bn. But much of what the state does is unavoidable, contracted for or politically protected. All the savings would have to come from one-third of the total budget, putting pressure on working age benefits, public sector pay and unprotected spending outside of health, education and foreign aid.
The Financial Times had good cause to champion the coalition's original fiscal plan. A deficit of £150bn needed immediate attention. A debt ratio rising by 8 percentage points every year had to be slowed down. When the economy faltered in the face of a European debt crisis, the government sensibly let deficit reduction pause. The state's balance sheet was used to support bank lending (and, less admirably, to subsidise housebuyers). Although investment took too hard a hit, the cuts were generally well calibrated. Public services show signs of strain, but still work.
The Tories have now taken a step too far. There is no emergency that compares with 2010, and no need for a fiscal surplus by 2020. The price of borrowing has fallen by half. The easier efficiencies have been found already.
The rush to surplus is to be achieved via measures left to guesswork: more than £10bn of cuts to social security, unspecified; a £5bn saving from tax avoidance measures, also unspecified; some £30bn from already pared-down departments responsible for defence, criminal justice, social care and the rest - details to follow. Yet rather than shed light on their thinking, the Tories have used the campaign to scatter promises of future generosity.
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>One side-effect of the Tories' obfuscation has been to encourage Ed Miliband, Labour's leader, into a late conversion to fiscal rigour. His stance is far from convincing. Labour and the other parties explain just as little (and plan to borrow a lot more), but their plans have £30bn to £40bn less to explain. During the South Sea Bubble of 1720 sentiment reached such a fevered height a company reportedly floated "for an undertaking of great advantage but nobody to know what it is".
The Conservatives have gambled that their stock trades so high it can be sold however they choose. It may be no more than a political ploy aimed at highlighting Labour's lack of economic trustworthiness. But unrealistic promises of less borrowing, less tax and more spending on the NHS under the Tories, with all details to follow, only jeopardises their hard-won reputation for fiscal prudence.
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