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Opinion: 'Ankara is no longer seen as a safe pair of hands'

Four years ago, Turkey was regarded as a linchpin of stability in the Middle East. It was a stalwart in the Nato alliance and a candidate member of the EU, under a pragmatic government with its roots in political Islam. Recep Tayyip Erdogan - then prime minister and now president - was regarded in the west as the safest available pair of hands in a region that regularly thwarted outsiders' efforts to shape it.

Turkey was counted a regional insider, admired for its high-growth economy and ostensible success in pioneering neo-Islamist politics attuned to a modern democracy.

It all seems a long time ago.

The vaunted foreign policy of Ahmet Davutoglu - then foreign minister, now prime minister - of "zero problems with the neighbours" turned into an equation whereby there were almost no neighbours with whom Turkey did not have problems: falling out at different times with Israel, Egypt, Syria, Iraq and, to a lesser extent, Saudi Arabia and Iran.

Many former admirers now look on with incredulous disappointment as the neo-Ottoman discourse of Mr Erdogan and Mr Davutoglu registers zero ability to account for their loss of reputation and regional influence.

The two men still embrace the idea of Turkey as the vanguard of a pan-Islamic civilisation, with the vocation to lead the old Ottoman hinterland of the Middle East, the Balkans and the Caucasus. But their policies have proved divisive at home and abroad. Ankara's policy towards Syria is a good example. With western blessing and broad Sunni Arab approval, Turkey served as the hub for rebels fighting to topple Bashar al-Assad in Syria. Mr Erdogan and Mr Davutoglu also appear to have gambled on victory in Syria for the pan-Islamic Muslim Brotherhood.

But, until last year, Turkey also allowed jihadi volunteers to use its territory to enter Syria. Though it favoured groups other than the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, Isis probably could not have come to dominate the insurgency in Syria and Iraq without Turkey's jihadi pipeline.

Western countries that called for the removal of Mr Assad, but stood aside when his regime crushed mainstream rebels, leaving totalitarian jihadis such as Isis to fill the vacuum, are hardly on morally high ground when they upbraid Turkey for this.

Mr Erdogan is right to insist on the need to get rid of Mr Assad. Just as Iraqi prime minister Nouri al-Maliki, a Shia Islamist sectarian, was pushed aside last year to clear the way in principle for Iraq's minority Sunni and Kurds to rally behind a more inclusive government, so only the departure of the Assad clique will re-energise the mainstream of Syria's Sunni majority and marginalise the extremists.

Yet, while his judgment on this may be right, Mr Erdogan's statecraft has been inept. He has managed to give the impression that Turkey is not a team player, may even support Isis, and is against the Kurdish minority with which he has done more than any other Turkish leader to seek a peaceful reconciliation. Ankara's policies towards other Arab conflicts often seem unrealistic or reactive.

He has voiced support for the Saudi-led Sunni alliance intervening in Yemen to push back the Shia Houthi movement allegedly backed by Iran.

But Turkey is at loggerheads with Egypt, a key alliance member, over Ankara's espousal of the Muslim Brotherhood, and looks more concerned about Iran consolidating power in neighbouring Iraq.

Ankara's western allies are just as concerned with Mr Erdogan's evident admiration for President Vladimir Putin of Russia and dalliance with China - with which Turkey, a Nato member, has been negotiating a missile defence system. Turkey currently chairs the G20 group of leading economies, yet the star turn at the ruling Justice and Development party's congress late last year was Khaled Meshaal, the Hamas leader.

The EU bears heavy responsibility for Turkey's long-stalled accession negotiations. But Mr Erdogan's authoritarian retreat into an illiberal democracy - questioning the rule of law and compromising freedom of expression and assembly - is pushing EU membership beyond reach.

Public opinion inside Turkey, once pro-EU but then disenchanted by anti-Turkish sentiment in Germany, France and Austria, is turning back towards Europe. The government's new EU affairs minister, Volkan Bozkir, appears open to initiatives. Ankara has agreed to discuss extending Turkey's 20-year-old customs union with the EU, whereas it had previously insisted the trade deal could only be superseded by full club membership.

But a relationship as dense as that of the EU with Turkey cannot end there. Sinan Ulgen, head of the liberal Edam think-tank in Istanbul, speculates about "a deep relationship short of membership that has still to be devised, a new model of association for those states with more to contribute than, say, Norway". That might catch on in Turkey, especially if another member state such as Britain were to exit the EU and recalibrate its relations. Turkey would not be alone.

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